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The discussion of this subject was suggested by the decision of
a recent case' in New Jersey involving a will in which the testatrix
left her estate in trust to her executor to sell and convert it and to pay
fifty dollars a month to her nephew for life and to turn over the
residue to the town of Bucksport, Maine, for the purpose of erecting
a monument to the memory of her brother, the site and the details
thereof to be left to the discretion of the proper authorities. The
will was contested on the ground that it involved a trust in perpetuity
and was not a charitable use. The court held that the law of charitable
uses was not involved in the case. The Vice-Chancellor, the late
Frederic W. Stevens, declined to follow the ruling of the late Vice-
Chancellor Howell in Morristown Trust Company v. Town of Mor-
ristown.2 He said it was contrary to a decision of the Court of
Chancery based upon well established rules of property and recog-
nized authority and referred to Detwiller v. Hartman,3 in which
Chancellor Runyon cited the decision of Sir Thomas Plumer in the
case of Mellick v. Guardians of the Asylum,' where he said
"the statute of mortmain does not hear a resemblance to anything
like a sumptuary law; and does not apply to property expended like
this" by the party on himself, for the gratification of his own vanity,
on an object, which, instead of having any similitude to charity, is
the very reverse of it; the builder of the monument is to be paid for
his labour only. It stands on the same footing as an expensive
funeral; and it has never been argued that the expences of a funeral
cannot be defrayed out of real estate. There is nothing to controul
the general right incident to property of disposing of it, either in
the party's life-time, or after his death, as he may think proper; and
though the sum which this testator has devoted to the erection of his
monument may be disproportioned to his station in life, the Court
cannot on any such grounds extend the construction of the statute."5
Vice-Chancellor Stevens said the only questions were whether Mrs.
Dean could lawfully give the residue of her estate to the town of
Bucksport to the memory of her brother, a prominent citizen of that
'Lawrence v. Prosser (1918, Ch.) 89 N. J. Eq. 248, 104 Atl. 772.
' (1913, Ch.) 82 N. J. Eq. 521, 9 Atl. 737.
8 (1883, Ch.) 37 N. J. Eq. 347. ' (182, Eng. Ch.) x Jac. 18o.
'Ibid., 184, quoted in Detwiller v. Hartman, supra, 353. See also Masters
v. Masters (0718, Eng. Ch.) i P. Wins. 421; Adnam v. Cole (0843, Eng. Ch.)
6 Beav. 353; Ogden, Petitioner (1903) 25 R. I. 373, 55 Atl. 933; Fancher v.
Fancher (igog) 156 Calif. 13, 1O3 Pac. 206.
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city; and secondly, whether the town of Bucksport had the capacity
to receive the gift and apply it as directed. The decision on both
points was in the affirmative.
Speaking of the contention that the bequest violated the rule against
perpetuities, the Vice-Chancellor said there was a palpable fallacy
underlying the complainants' argument on this head, that because
a monument is likely to endure beyond the legal period the case is
one of perpetuity, and on the question of capacity he said it was
established at least in this country that municipalities are capable of
taking property in trust for purposes germane to the objects of their
incorporation, that in all ages civilized communities have adorned their
ways and parks with memorials of .their illustrious dead and it was
idle to assert that columns and statuary have no proper place in them.
The question, what is meant by a monument, was suggested in that
case but was not involved in it. The will as originally drawn pro-
vided expressly for a gift of a sum of money for the erection of a
town hall as a memorial to the brother of the testatrix but in the last
will the word was monument, but the question whether the money
can be applied to the erection of a town hall has not yet arisen At
this time, when many minds are set upon erecting fitting memorials
for those who have given their lives in the late war and are thinking
also of social and civil welfare and of erecting worthy buildings
for carrying it out, it may well become a practical question whether
the word "monument" in a will or deed of gift may be taken to
include a building or must be confined to the shaft or arch or statue
with which the word has been associated.
There are cases in which the decision depended upon the context
or the circumstances, as for example, the amount of money to be
expended and its relation to the space of ground to be used. In the
case of the proposed monument.in Independence Square in Phila-
delphia6 the question was whether the proposed monument was within
the prohibition against erecting buildings in that square. The court
said:
"A monument may take the shape of a memorial hall or other
building, but that is not the general sense of the word and will not
be presumed,"I
and the decision was that a memorial which took the form of a shaft
or column was not within the prohibition against buildings and might
be erected in Independence Square.
In a case in the New York Court of Appeals, involving a ques-
tion of the law of salee8 allusion was made to the use of the word
"monument" in connection with St. Paul's Cathedral and Sir Chris-
'Society of the Cincinnati's Appeal (1893) 154 Pa. 621, 26 AtI. 647.
TIbid., 635.
'Cooke v. Millard (1875) 65 N. Y. 352, 363.
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topher Wren and to the remarks of the court in another case 9 to
the effect that where pieces of marble were put together and stood in
a marble yard without an inscription, there was no monument in
existence at the time. Dwight, Commissioner, said:
"the notion that such an arrangement of marble placed in a cemetery
over a grave can not be regarded as a monument, in the absence of
an inscription, seems highly strained. Then there could not be a
memorial church without an inscription. . . . It would seem to be
enough if the monument reminds the passer by of- him whom it is
intended to commemorate, and this might be by tradition, inscriptions
on adjoining or neighboring objects, or otherwise.'' 10
In Fancher v. Fancher,"' a testator declared that $25,000 should be
set aside for the erection of a suitable monument to his memory and
directed that he should be buried on his ranch. The .decision was
that his will would not be complied with by spending $2,000 on a
granite monument on his ranch and $20o,00 on building a public
library in a distant city. In view of the fact that he used the word
"monument" in connection with his funeral expenses and the inter-
ment of his remains, it was to be taken that he used the word as
indicating a pillar, a statue or a shaft, or some structure placed over
the grave on the ranch and not a memorial library in the city. Again
in the Ogden case' 2 Judge Stiness said:
"While it is true that lexicographers include structures and build-
ings in the definition of the word monument, we are required in this
case to ascertain, not its possible meaning, but its meaning as indicated
by the intent of the testator
3"
and he said that in this particular will a distinction was made between
a monument and a memorial.
The word "monument" has a much broader meaning than a tomb-
stone or a memorial shaft. Its primary meaning is a memorial. The
Latin word "monumentum" is derived from the verb "monere," to
remind or admonish. The definition in Andrew's Latin Dictionary
is as follows: "That which preserves the remembrance of anything,
a memorial; a monument, especially buildings, statues, galleries and
tombs erected to perpetuate the remembrance of a, person or thing."
For example, there is cited from Cicero "monumentum Marii," the
temple built by Marius, and again, "monumentum senatus," the house
of Cicero built by the Senate. In Murray's Dictionary we find:
"(4) Anything that by its survival commemorates a person, an action,
period or event; (5) a structure, edifice or erection intended to
commemorate a notable person, action or event." Webster's Dictionary
includes, "a building, pillar, stone, or the like, erected to preserve the
'Mead v. Casi (186o, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 33 Barb. 202.
'o Cooke v. Millard, supra, 363-364. 1 1Supra.
L2 Supra. 1 Ibid., 374.
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remembrance of a person, event, action," and the Standard mentions
"any conspicuous 6r fine structure, especially considered as a memorial
of the past."
It is clear that the primary purpose expressed by the word "monu-
ment" is a memorial, and that when the word is used without
reference to a tomb and in connection with a generous gift to a city
the memorial may well take the form of a public building, such as a
town hall, a library or a museum, such a building as may serve not
merely as a public memorial, but also for the common good-for the
adornment of the town, for the education, for public health, the
promotion of art, the dignity and efficiency of government.
The discussion of gifts or devises for monuments does not neces-
sarily involve the law of perpetuities. The gift or bequest of a sum
of n5oney for the erection of a monument, whether as a memorial
of the donor or some one else, and whether public or private, is valid
and not subject to objection as a perpetuity. It is only in case the
gift or bequest involves the investment or control of the principal
and the use of the income for maintenance or repairs that the ques-
tion arises whether the purpose of the monument is either a charitable
use or such a public use as may be accepted by the public authorities.
The statute of 43 Elizabeth, chapter 4, made express mention of a
number of specific objects for the public welfare. They were not,
perhaps, the same objects as would have been mentioned in a modern
statute, but they are objects of public concern and such that the gift
would save the public expense or serve the public welfare, and whether
there be a trust or not the question of the validity of a gift for a
public monument depends very much upon whether the monument is
germane to the functions of the public authorities and conducive to
the public welfare.
The permanent character of the structure that is provided for by
the gift does not create in itself a legal perpetuity. There is, as the
Vice-Chancellor said in the recent New Jersey case, a fallacy under-
lying the argument that because a monument is likely to last beyond
the legal period, the case is one of perpetuity. Perpetuity of legal
ownership of land and buildings is involved in ownership in fee, but
if there be a trust for an indefinite and fluctuating body, it must, in
order to be valid, be held for a charitable purpose or for a public
body,14 and among the purposes mentioned by Justice Gray in Jack-
son v. Phillips is "erecting or maintaining public buildings or works
or otherwise lessening the burdens of government."' 5 The capacity
of cities and towns to receive and hold the title to property by gift
or devise was recognized even before it was allowed to private cor-
porations. In McDonogh's Executors v. Murdock, Mr. Justice Camp-
bell said that
1 Lewin, Law of Trusts (12th ed. i911) 18; Tudor, Charitable Trusts (4th
ed. i9o6) 5-5.'3(1867) 96 Mass. 539, 556.
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"The Roman jurisprudence . seems originally to have denied
to cities a capacity to inherit, or even to take by donation or legacy.
They were treated as composed of uncertain persons, who could not
perform the acts of volition and personalty involved in the acceptance
of a succession. The disability was removed by the Emperor Adrian
in regard to donations and legacies, and soon legacies ad ornaturm
civitatis and ad honorem civitatis become frequent. Legacies for
the relief of the poor, aged, and helpless, and for the education of
children, were ranked of the latter class. This capacity was enlarged
by the Christian emperors, and after the time of Justinian there was
no impediment. Donations for charitable uses were then favored;
and this favorable legislation was diffused over Europe by the canon
law, so that it became the common law of Christendom."' 6
It was not until the time of Henry III that limitations began to be
made upon the power to convey lands to corporations, especially
religious corporations, but it was not until a century later that there
was direct inhibition of conveyance to cities and boroughs "which
have offices perpetual." The opinion of Mr. Justice Campbell con-
tains an account of the history of the doctrine of perpetuities and the
statutes of mortmain, with references to the civil law, and concludes
that the cities of Baltimore and New Orleans were capable of taking
a universal title under the laws of Louisiana of real and personal
property to be devoted perpetually to the instruction of the poor in
wisd6m and to lead them into the path of holiness. Justice Campbell
quoted the rule of the civil law stated by Domat:
"One can bequeathe or devise to a city or other corporation what-
soever, ecclesiastical or lay, and appropriate the gift to some lawful
and honorable purpose, or for public works, for feeding the poor, or
for other objects of piety or beneficence."' 17
The principle is the same as that which underlies the doctrine of
charitable uses; relaxing the restrictions imposed by the statutes of
mortmain; but dities were not within the purpose of those statutes,
and in an early treatise it is declared that none of these statutes
included cities.1 s
In a recent case in New Jersey 0 in which upon the determination
of life estates certain tracts of land were devised to the city of
Newark with a residuary devise to Yale University, Vice-Chancellor
Stevens said:
"The next question is whether Newark has capacity to take. Of
this there can be no doubt. By the general rule of the common law,
says Kyd (p. 74), a body corporate is capable of taking any grant
of property in the same manner as private persons.
'20
16 (i853, U. S.) 15 How. 367, 404-405.
'Ibid., 410. Of the origin of wills to pious uses in the Roman law, Mr.
Wheaton speaks in his learned note in (18ig, U. S.) 4 Wheat. Appendix, 1, 4.
lei Kyd, Corporations (793) I05.
'Guild v. City of Newark (1x16, Ch.) 87 N. J. Eq. 38, 99 Atl. 120.
"Ibid., 42.
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The purposes for which such gifts may be received are
"not only those for which such towns may raise and assess money
on the inhabitants by taxation, but to analogous purposes, or those
of a like kind; such as are for the common convenience and accom-
modation of the inhabitants, though not by law." 21
There can be no question but that monuments as memorials of public
men and events may be provided for by private munificence and
accepted and held by the public authorities'. Whether they be fur-
nished at the public expense by taxation may depend upon the powers
conferred by statute upon the municipality.
There are, of course, many cases in which the gift or bequest
involves the investment of a fund and the perpetual use of the income,
so that the validity of the donation depends upon the doctrine of
charitable uses. The principles are well settled and the cases are too
numerous and too various for discussion here. The substance of
these discussions is that a gift or devise of a sum of money for the
erection of a definite structure far a perpetual memorial and without
the creation of a trust fund of which the income is to be used in
perpetuity does not involve the doctrine of charitable trusts. It is
of no consequence whether the monument is public or private. It
is nothing more than the disposition of property by will or deed. The
gift or devise of such a monument to a municipality is not in violation
of the rule against perpetuities. Included among the rights, privi-
I.ges, powers and immunities of an owner of property is the privilege
and -power to dispose of his estate by will or by deed. The disposi-
tion may involve no trust in perpetuity, and if it does, the trust is
for.one of the public purposes that are recognized as charitable uses
and are such as municipalities may lawfully accept.
Whether the word "monument" as used in the deed or will would
privilege -the erection of a public building or something other than
the conventional monument may depend upon indications in the will
or the circumstances there appearing, but the real meaning of the
word conveying the purpose it expresses is broad enough to include
a structure which serves primarily for commemoration, even though
it serves some other purpose not inconsistent with the first. Not only
have monuments been set up in churches through all the centuries,
but churches also and chantries have been themselves the monuments
of the saints whether ancient or contemporary, and the church of
St. Genevieve in Paris was called the Pantheon and designated as
the monument to the great men of the nation. Churches, hospitals
and public buildings are appropriate monuments of the illustrious
dead and of public benefactors, and the first building erected for the
first collegiate school in New Haven was, in fact, made a monument
to its founder, Elihu Yale.
"Nourse v. Merrians. (1851, Mass.) 8 Cush. ii, i9.
